Final Reports

Reverse Thrust Engaged During Unstabilized Approach

Fairchild SA227-DC Metro 23, Sept. 7, 2023, Detour Lake Aerodrome, Ontario, Canada

Recorded flight data showed that during the scheduled commuter flight’s second instrument approach to its destination, the engines were twice briefly put into beta mode, also known as reverse thrust. Three of the eight passengers and one of the two pilots suffered minor injuries when the twin-engine turboprop’s right wing struck Runway 10 of Detour Lake Aerodrome (CDT9), collapsing the nose and right main landing gear and causing both propellers to strike the pavement before the aircraft slid across and off the runway.

The aircraft was on an IFR flight from North Bay, Ontario (CYYB) to CDT9 and had previously suffered a loss of cabin pressure that prompted an emergency descent from 16,000 to 8,900 feet and a diversion towards Timmins Airport (CYTS) before the pilots restored pressurization using manual control. They then resumed the flight to CDT9.

The first GPS approach to Runway 10 ended with the airplane not aligned with the runway, leading to a missed approach. The rate of descent on the second approach increased from 1,000 to 2,000 fpm, triggering a “sink rate” warning from the ground proximity warning system. The flight data recorder logged negative torque indicating reverse thrust on both engines twice in the last seconds of the flight, and at an altitude of 11 feet the airplane rolled 15 degrees right in a nose-down attitude, striking the runway. Prevailing weather included winds from 340 degrees, varying from 300 to 360, at 9 knots gusting to 19 under a 300-foot overcast.

Whiteout Precipitated Fatal Longline Crash

Bell 206L, Feb. 12, 2024, Fort Chipewyan Airport, Alberta, Canada

Whiteout conditions caused the solo VFR-only pilot to suffer spatial disorientation, resulting in his fatal crash onto the frozen surface of Lake Athabasca as he tried to regain visual references. During the day’s second flight conducting geosurvey operations using a sensor on a 300-foot longline, a second company pilot at their base at Fort Chipewyan Airport (CYPY) phoned the 2,500-hour commercial pilot to advise of heavy snowfall approaching from the northwest. They agreed that he should return after finishing the current survey line, which he did at 14:38 local time.

Ground track data showed that early in the southwesterly 21-nm return flight, the helicopter began deviating right of course. After a brief further deviation eastward, it turned back towards the airport, and when it was within 2 nm, the pilot activated the runway lights but could not see them. Ground personnel estimated visibility at the time as ¼ mile in blowing snow. The second pilot could hear the helicopter but not see it. It had come within half a mile of the Runway 22 threshold when its pilot reported that he had lost all visual references and the helicopter was accumulating ice.

He made a 180-degree turn, then, at the suggestion of the second pilot, turned right towards Lake Athabasca in search of better visibility and ground reference. The last data point was recorded at 15:15, 3.3 nm east-southeast of the airport and showed the helicopter flying east-southeast at 27 knots and 839 feet. Two minutes later the pilot reported that he had released the external load but lost control of the aircraft, which was spinning. Impact occurred at 15:18.

Spatial Disorientation Preceded In-flight Break-up

Pilatus PC-12/47E, July 26, 2024, Recluse, Wyoming

Flight track data and satellite imagery indicated that the airplane was likely in an area of precipitation inside cumulus clouds at 26,000 feet when the pilot lost control of the airplane after reporting “loss” of the autopilot. The single-engine turboprop then made a 270-degree turn at altitudes varying from 25,250 to 27,025 feet before entering a steep descending right turn. The last radar contact showed a groundspeed of 256 knots as it descended through 21,900 feet; all seven occupants perished when it broke apart from overload at low altitude. Fragments of the left wing were found 0.82 miles from the main wreckage.

The NTSB concluded: “The airplane’s erratic flight track in the final 2 minutes…were consistent with the known effects of spatial disorientation.”

Night Charter Misidentified Heliport

Sikorsky S-76, Aug. 31, 2025, Round Mountain, Texas

The pilots’ confusion over their position while approaching a rural heliport on a dark night led them to descend into trees more than a mile and a half from their destination. Both pilots and their only passenger suffered serious injuries, and the twin--engine turbine helicopter incurred “substantial damage to the fuselage, the main rotor system, the tail boom, the empennage, and the tail rotor system.” The accident site was “a heavily wooded area next to a recreational vehicle park…about 1.54 miles north of the heliport” on the opposite side of “a prominent east-to-west-running river.”

Due to prior anomalies with the autopilot, the captain chose not to file an IFR flight plan for the Part 135 charter from Dallas Love Field (KDAL) to Mirasol Hills Heliport (TA22), and while an instrument approach procedure was loaded into the flight management system, it was never activated. Both pilots monitored the flight’s progress via ForeFlight, and the first officer activated the heliport’s green ground lights by radio.

Both pilots “acknowledged observing green lights in their sight.” As the captain maneuvered for landing, he “lost outside visual references, and…transitioned to instruments.” At a radar altimeter of 20 feet, the terrain awareness and warning system alerted, but before the first officer could call for a go-around, the helicopter struck trees.

Prevailing weather included 3-knot winds and 7 miles visibility with zero temperature--dewpoint spread. The operator suggested that “a night vision goggle program for non-airport operations” might have prevented the accident.

Fuel Exhaustion Left King Air Crew Out of Time, Altitude

Beechcraft King Air E90, June 16, 2025, Gardner, Kansas

Fuel exhaustion led to a left engine flameout during a go-around at New Century AirCenter Airport (KIXD), according to the NTSB’s final report. The flight instructor had not performed adequate fuel planning, and the report further noted that he had not adequately monitored the pilot receiving instruction, which led to inadequate airspeed in the pattern and the need for the go-around. Both pilots sustained minor injuries after the twin turboprop crashed into a hangar at the airport.

The aircraft had departed from Butler Memorial Airport (KBUM) in Missouri for KIXD for two purposes: a scheduled transponder test and additional King Air flight time for the pilot receiving instruction. Both pilots checked the cockpit fuel gauges during preflight and acknowledged the readings were within the yellow caution band on both wing tanks. The Beech E90 airplane flight manual prohibits takeoffs when fuel gauges indicate within the yellow caution band, defined as zero to 260 pounds of fuel. In a subsequent NTSB interview, the instructor claimed not to have been aware of the airplane’s minimum takeoff fuel requirements. Neither pilot visually inspected the fuel tanks during the preflight walkaround.

Before takeoff, the flight instructor intentionally disabled the auto-feather system, intending to conduct a single-engine demonstration during the flight.

In the traffic pattern at KIXD, the airplane was “a little high” on the downwind leg with airspeed “a little fast,” the flight instructor told the NTSB. During the turn from base leg to final, the instructor said his attention had been diverted to a mobile phone to review the airport diagram and taxi route to the maintenance facility. When he looked up, the airplane was in what he described as a “steep dive” at approximately 85 knots, below the 110-knot target for that phase of flight. The instructor directed the pilot receiving instruction to increase engine power; after the throttles were advanced, the airplane yawed left. The instructor “suspected that the left engine flamed out due to fuel starvation” and took control of the aircraft.

The instructor retracted the gear and flaps, applied full right rudder, and rolled toward the operating right engine. The left propeller was not feathered, and the instructor believed it was still producing limited thrust. Despite the corrective inputs, the airplane continued turning left. ADS-B data confirmed that the airplane had dropped below Vmc during the base-to-final turn and continued to decelerate during the go-around. The instructor did not attempt to return to the runway, believing the airplane was accelerating and would clear a hangar ahead. The airplane hit the hangar and came to rest on the roof.

Based on the fuel recovered after the accident, the NTSB said there was likely insufficient fuel remaining to complete a go-around and re-enter the traffic pattern with one engine operating. “When drained, the left- and right-wing fuel tanks contained about three fluid ounces and about 30 fluid ounces of fuel, respectively.”

An FAA inspector confirmed that the left propeller showed blade damage consistent with a lack of engine power at impact, while the right propeller reflected an operating engine. The autofeather switch was not in the armed position. No flight manual or pilot operating handbook was found aboard the airplane; the only checklist in the cockpit was labeled “Simulator Use Only.”

—Amy Wilder contributed to this report