On March 29, 2001 a series of operational and instrument approach procedural errors led to the crash of N303GA, a Gulfstream III, just 2,400 ft short of the approach end of Aspen-Pitkin County Airport (ASE)’s Runway 15 while attempting to complete the VOR/DME C circling approach. Eighteen people, including three crewmembers lost their lives in the accident. The NTSB report of the crash (see 'Pressure on pilots a key factor in Aspen GIII crash') was riddled with lessons about what pilots flying under instrument flight rules should not do, ranging from examples of poor crew coordination, to serious misunderstandings of basic instrument procedures, such as the fact that the GIII– certified as a Category D aircraft– was not even authorized to shoot the approach to Aspen under any conditions. Descending below the MDA without adequate reference to the airport environment was also noted.
This was hardly the kind of performance expected of professional pilots operating a sophisticated jet under Part 135 into a mountainous area at night. Adding to the irony of the accident was the pressure put on the flight crew by the customer to get the passengers to Aspen at all costs. In addition to listing a number of errors made by the crew of N303GA, the NTSB strongly recommended the FAA revise some ambiguous procedures that even the board found confusing and potentially unsafe.