I know the FAA is facing a lot of harsh criticism since the two Boeing 737 Max accidents less than six months apart: the Lion Air Flight 610 crash in Indonesia in October 2018 and the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 crash in March 2019. But those criticisms have focused on the FAA’s certification of the Boeing 737 Max and its oversight of Boeing. Some of that criticism is justified, in particular, allowing the aircraft to be certified with just one angle-of-attack (AOA) sensor for its MCAS—flight control software—system. One sensor for a critical component is a design failure that Boeing and the FAA should never have allowed. But there are more questions that the FAA needs to answer as a result of these accidents and their aftermath.
While Boeing and the FAA made their share of mistakes in certifying the 737 Max, my review of the available public information shines an even harsher light on Lion Air and its operation of revenue service flying passengers. And it begs the question, why has the Indonesian government failed to take strong action in light of the glaring maintenance and other errors revealed by its own accident report? And, if the accident report wasn’t enough, a New York Times investigation of the airline should be. If reporters could find these problems, one would hope the government agency entrusted with ensuring aviation safety in Indonesia could, as well.