The Japanese trifecta of tragedy has some people rethinking risk-assessment models and catastrophic risk in general. And maybe those of us in aviation should as well. After all, these models are only as good as the assumptions that are made about the likelihood of an event–or a series of events–occurring. In Japan, someone underestimated the potential threat of a 9.0 earthquake, a tsunami higher than the seawalls around the nuclear power plants and the ability of the nuclear plants to keep cooling in the face of these natural disasters. A lot of “someones,” including government regulators, presumably went along with the risk assessments that minimized the potential strength of an earthquake, the height of an eventual tsunami and, of course, a lot of things related to protecting the nuclear rods from meltdown and the safety of the method used for storage of spent fuel.
It’s only now, in the weeks after the stunning loss of life and still-unfolding nuclear drama, that experts are saying that the scale of the natural disasters was in fact predictable and damage to the nuclear plants was not only foreseeable but preventable. Earthquakes greater than those the nuclear plants were built to withstand were within the potential range for the area and so on. Is this just a case of 20-20 hindsight? Or were there powerful factors–the pursuit of profits–at work, clouding people’s visions of risks and disastrous outcomes if all the remote, but catastrophic, risks lined up? How good is a risk assessment model if worst-case scenarios are discounted?